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Abstract. In this article, the author considers the particularities of Franz Brentano’s psychognosy (descrip-
tive psychology) in the context of notion of “basic” or “analytic” truths and his methodological approaches to 
scientific, philosophical investigations as well as his influence upon Kasimir Twardowski, who was the pupil 
of Brentano and accepted the main points of his methodological program. 
The author also stresses that the study of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s heritage is important for tracing 
the origin of scientific/analytic philosophy. It is very important to investigate Brentano-Twardowski relations 
in the context of the concept of “basic truths” or “analytic truths”. Brentano stresses that “basic truths” can be 
found thanks to “psychognosy” or “pure psychology”. For Twardowski, psychology is the base for philosophical 
investigations because it helps to understand the formation of notions and judgements.
This article is also dedicated to the inquiries of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s legacy provided by Ukrainian 
scholars Borys Dombrowskiy and Yanosh Sanotskiy. The reception of Brentano’s theory of judgement in 
Dombrowskiy’s works and the problem of Brentano’s psychologism in Sanotskiy’s works were examined. 
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F. Brentano ir K. Twardowskis: jų įtakos pėdsakai  
šiuolaikinių Ukrainos mokslininkų darbuose
Santrauka. Straipsnio autorius apžvelgia Franzo Brentano psichognozijos (aprašomosios psichologijos) ypatu-
mus „pamatinių“ arba „analitinių“ tiesų, taip pat ir Brentano moksliniuose bei filosofiniuose tyrimuose taikytų 
metodologinių prieigų požiūriu. Įvertinama Brentano įtaka jo buvusiam mokiniui Kasimirui Twardowskiui, 
sutikusiam su pagrindiniais jo metodologinės programos teiginiais. Autorius pabrėžia, kad Brentano ir 
Twardowskio palikimas turi būti tiriamas siekiant suprasti mokslinės arba analitinės filosofijos kilmę; ypač 
svarbu tirti Brentano ir Twardowskio ryšį „pamatinių tiesų“ bei „analitinių tiesų“ sąvokų kontekste. Brentano 
pabrėžia, kad „pamatinės tiesos“ gali būti nustatytos remiantis „psichognozija“, arba „grynąja psichologija“. 
Twardowskio požiūriu, filosofinių tyrimų pagrindas yra psichologija, kadangi ji padeda suprasti, kaip susifor-
muoja sąvokos ir sprendiniai. Šis straipsnis taip pat atsižvelgia į ukrainiečių mokslininkų Boryso Dombrowskio 
ir Yanosho Sanotskio pastangas tiriant Brentano ir Twardowskio palikimą: įvertinama Brentano sprendinio 
teorijos recepcija Dombrowskio darbuose ir Brentano psichologizmo problema Sanotskio tyrimuose. 
Pagrindiniai žodžiai: Borysas Dombrowskis, Franzas Brentano, Kasimiras Twardowskis, Yanoshas Sanotskis, 
Lvovo filosofinė mokykla, psichognozija, pamatinės tiesos
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Polish philosopher Kasimir Twardowski (1866-1938) was the founder of the Lviv1 
Philosophical School (1895-1939), the catalyst of development of analytic or scientific 
philosophy in its early period. He managed not only to revive philosophical life in Eastern 
Galicia, but he also turned Lviv into an important center of philosophical life in Eastern 
and Central Europe. It was due to fact that Twardowski managed to realize the metho-
dological and psychological ideas of his teacher, the German-Austrian philosopher of 
Italian origin, ontologist, psychologist, and logician Franz Brentano (1838-1917), in his 
own philosophical activity. 
Also, it is worth noting that Twardowski’s ideas and methodological approaches to 
philosophical researchers had influence not only upon Polish and Jewish students of the 
University of Lviv, but upon Ukrainian students too. The book of Polish-Ukrainian scholar 
Stepan Ivanyk reveals some “white spots” of relationships between Twardowski and his 
Ukrainian pupils; lists Ukrainian students and intellectuals, who were influenced by the 
founder of the Lviv Philosophical School (see Ivanyk 2014). 
To sum up, there are three main goals of this article: 1) to make some contribution 
to the understanding of Brentano’s psychognosy (descriptive or “pure” psychology) and 
methodological ideas, 2) to describe briefly the influence of Brentano’s methodological 
ideas on Twardowski, and 3) to analyze some works of a few contemporary Ukrainian 
authors who demonstrated at least some reception of Brentano’s theory of judgement 
(Borys Dombrowskiy) and the problem of psychologism in Brentano’s philosophy (Ya-
nosh Sanotskiy). 
1. Brentano’s Psychognosy and the Idea of  
Methodological Unity of Sciences and Humanities
The term “psychognosy”2 is quite unspecified for Ukrainian scholars. If someone hears 
it, then he/she may associate it with gnosis – esoteric knowledge that is accessible to a 
few initiated people. However, Brentano used this word in order to signify the branch 
of psychology, which precedes genetic psychology. The other word-combinations which 
Brentano uses in order to signify this branch are “descriptive psychology” and “descrip-
tive phenomenology”. 
We have chosen the term “psychognosy” because the adjective “descriptive” in the 
word-combinations “descriptive psychology” and “descriptive phenomenology” is am-
biguous and it was criticized by the pupils of Husserl, for instance, by Eugen Fink. 
1  The English-speaking philosophers traditionally use the Russian spelling “Lvov” (in Russian “Львов”), be-
cause in Soviet times the Ukrainian name “Lviv” (in Ukrainian “Львів”) was transferred to Russian as “Lvov”. The 
Soviet Union is very often associated with Russia. Therefore, the name of “the Capital of Galicia” (Twardowski 
2018: 99) was translated into English from the Russian version “Lvov”. I think that the Ukrainian spelling of the 
name of the city, i.e. “Lviv”, in the phrase “Lviv Philosophical School” or “Lviv-Warsaw School”, will be more 
proper. 
2  Edmund Husserl who studied philosophy in Wien under the tutelage of Franz Brentano gives this indirect 
definition of psychognosy: “[…] we find in certain psychologists, and first in Brentano, a systematic effort to create 
a rigorously scientific psychology on the basis of pure internal experience and the rigorous description of its data 
(Psychognosia)” (Husserl 1997: 213-214).
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Very often the adjective “descriptive” is associated with another adjective “naïve”, 
because it is connected with the superficial description of what is given before our con-
sciousness. Moreover, description as the kind of investigation may be associated with 
the method of positive sciences, which is grounded in pure descriptive factual propo-
sitions. Thus, someone may think that “descriptive psychology” and “descriptive phe-
nomenology” are positive sciences. The word-combinations “descriptive psychology” 
and “descriptive phenomenology” may give us the false understanding of the adjective 
“descriptive” as something not important, as something superficial, without analysis, as 
something positive, as something pre-conceptual etc. and based on merely sensuous per-
ception and observation3. If we consider the adjective “descriptive” with the connection 
of analysis as “descriptive analysis”, even then, said Fink, we cannot avoid the associ-
ation with the adjective “wearied”. Of course, Fink meant “wearied” as the synonym to 
“descriptive” (Fink 1981: 22-55).
Therefore, psychognosy is a neutral term and less known than “descriptive psychol-
ogy” or “descriptive phenomenology”. Its meaning directly denotes the task of such 
science as psychognosy: it gives the knowledge about our psychic life on the basis of 
inner perception and introspection. 
Now we consider the difference between genetic psychology and psychognosy. Ge-
netic psychology deals with psychic phenomena which occur because of physiological, 
physical, chemical processes and refer to a human body. Psychognosy is different, since 
it deals with pure psychic phenomena of inner lives of humans on the base of their inner 
perception, and it helps to determine “the elements of human consciousness and the ways 
they are connected” (Brentano 2002: 3). Here “pure” refers to psychic processes free of 
the body. Psychognosy deals with consciousness only and its tasks are 1) “to provide us 
with the general conception of the entire realm of human consciousness”, 2) to list fully 
“the basic components out of which internally perceived by humans are composed”, 3) to 
enumerate “the ways in which these components can be connected” (Brentano 2002: 4). 
The important goal of psychognosy is the analysis of experience and the ways it can be 
the basis for certainty and clarity. In order to obtain this goal, Brentano classified the hu-
man mental states as ideas (presentations), judgements and emotions. Ideas provide the 
basis for judgements and emotions.
Brentano’s claim that psychognosy is an exact science seems very important (Bren-
tano 2002: 5). We suggest that this very specific claim of Brentano is the implicit base of 
the scientific character of any inquiry.
For Brentano, psychognosy is an exact science because it is founded on the elements 
of consciousness. Those elements are immediately evident and have an apodictic charac-
ter. Thus, when there is such apodictic evidence then we have also apodictic perception 
and on the basis of it – apodictic motivated judgement: “A judgment is motivated [mo-
3  For example, let me consider two sentences “I see this table, and I am talking about that table” and “I am 
angry, and I am talking about my angriness”. In the first case we deal with the outer perception and in the second 
case we deal with the inner perception. In the both cases we deal with the merely descriptions, which describe our 
outer or inner perception. 
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tiviert] if it is directly caused by another mental phenomenon, and if we perceive this 
causation. In the case of apodictic judgements, we have a motivation by the matter of 
presentation [Vorstellungsmaterie]. One speaks of assertorial judgments if this kind of 
motivation is not present. Assertorial hence indicates a mere privation; the motivation by 
the matter of presentation is not given” (Brentano 1956: 128). Therefore, psychognosy is 
the basis for scientific philosophy and for any science which gives researchers strict and 
exact judgements about consciousness. 
Inner perception4 is always true because it is based on evidence. Inner perception 
constitutes inner experience that is the source of evidence. All that is given in inner ex-
perience is given clearly and evidently. 
The exactness of psychognosy derives from the simple and evident ideas which lie 
at the basis of our mind. Brentano searched for elemental parts of our mind which are 
evident and undoubted. Here we can see some similarity between rationalists (Descartes, 
Leibniz), who also searched for evident and undoubted ideas or axioms in mind. Therefore, 
Descartes, Leibniz, and Brentano are representatives of inner realism. How does this inner 
certainty appear? Inner certainty is grounded on clear, understandable psychic elements, 
which we can consider as atoms of our mind. Those bases or atoms are undoubted; thus 
they are true. How can we find them? We can find them using the method of introspection. 
Descartes dreamt of the classification of simple ideas in order to clarify human thoughts 
and make them transparent and unambiguous: “If someone explained correctly what the 
simple ideas are out of which all human thoughts are compounded, and if his explanation 
were generally accepted, I would venture to expect there to be a universal language that 
was easy to learn, to speak and to write, and – the main thing – that would help men’s 
judgement by presenting matters to them so clearly that it would be almost impossible 
for them to go wrong. Contrast that with what we have now: almost all our words have 
confused meanings, and men’s minds have been accustomed to them for so long that 
there’s hardly anything they can perfectly understand” (Descartes 2017: 8).
We must go deeper and deeper into our mind in order to find out simple and clear ideas, 
which we must use in our language; otherwise, we are doomed to formulate incorrect 
propositions. Only propositions that are grounded in simple ideas are true. As we know, 
Descartes found in the base of mathematics some fundamental mental operations. One of 
these operations is the ability of the mind (or reason) to grasp directly and clearly simple 
4  In this article, I take into consideration only judgements which are derived from inner perception. For Brentano, 
such judgements are self-evident. But Brentano also introduced another kind of self-evident judgements on the basis 
of axioms. Let me quote Wolfgang Stegmüller: “Only axioms and judgements of inner perception are self-evident. 
These two sorts of judgements, however, are completely different in nature. Following Leibniz, who distinguished 
between truths of reason and truths of fact, Brentano assumes two sources of knowledge: axioms, or apodictic truths 
that are evident from concepts (Brentano also calls them a priori judgements, since they need no further corroboration 
from experience), and the immediate self-evidence of inner perception.” (Stegmüller 1969: 32). Thus, Brentano is not 
“pure” empiricist. He tried to synthesize rationalistic and empirical positions: “All concepts are indeed derived from 
experience, but these empirically acquired concepts can give rise to self-evident, apodictic judgements and thus to a 
priori knowledge. For instance, the proposition ‘There is no judgement without a representation’ is apodictic, whereas 
the concepts ‘judgement’ and ‘representation’ are obtained from inner experience.” (ibid., 33). 
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ideas, which are identical with the basic truths. The French rationalist was convinced that 
a human mind can know these ideas or basic truths with absolute certainty and clarity (if 
so, then these ideas or truths are necessary to be accepted). 
It is well-known that Leibniz distinguished two kinds of truths: necessary truths and 
contingent truths. We are interested in the first kind of truths because they belong to mind 
or reason. Leibniz wrote in §33 of the Monadology: “There are also two kinds of Truths: 
those of Reasoning and those of Fact. The Truths of Reasoning are necessary, and their 
opposite is impossible. Those of fact, however, are contingent, and their opposite is pos-
sible. When a truth is necessary, the reason can be found by analysis in resolving it into 
simpler ideas and into simpler truths until we reach those which are primary” (Leibniz 
1990: 460). There are very important words of Leibniz about “the primary truths” which 
belong to our reason or mind and can be found by analysis. Analysis means that we “are 
resolving” very complex ideas of our mind into simpler and simpler ideas until we reach 
their ultimate ground. According to Leibniz, the truths of reason are true always, under 
any circumstances and conditions. In addition, we cannot forget that Leibniz argued that 
necessary truths depend on God’s intellect. For Descartes, God is the guarantor that simple 
ideas are true because they are self-evident and clear5. 
Descartes, Leibniz, and Brentano are forerunners of scientific philosophy. What does 
the word “scientific” mean? This word derived from Latin verb “scire”, which means “to 
know” in English. Scientific philosophy strives to obtain exact and strict knowledge as well 
as any other science (physics, biology, chemistry, cosmology and so on). Descartes and 
Leibniz claimed that there is exact and strict knowledge, which we can find by analyzing 
of the mind/reason functioning. In the case of Brentano, the analysis of inner perception 
can help us to find such kind of knowledge. 
We can suppose that in any science, including scientific philosophy, the exactness, and 
the strictness, may be defined in such a way: 1) exactness is determined by the absence 
of deviations in the calculations that lead to the result that coincides with the calcula-
tions, 2) strictness lies in the fact that the decision of the given task will be the same by 
any means. Therefore, in scientific philosophy or analytic philosophy, all judgements 
about some philosophical subject must demonstrate unity with that subject and must not 
contradict it. In the case of Brentano, we must remember that those clear and self-evident 
judgements are derived from inner perception. Our judgements are true when we judge 
with evidence on the basis of our inner perception of outer objects. In the Brentano’s 
early writings, especially in the “Psychology from the empirical point of view”, we can 
find what means to be true in relation to outer objects. Brentano said: “whether the object 
is of such a sort that one could stand in the appropriate relation to it” (Brentano 2009: 
187) and added in his notes for “Logic Lectures” (1875): “The object is’ means… that 
the object is to be accepted or affirmed, i.e., that it can be correctly affirmed.”6 (Brentano 
5  Today, it is very hard to understand how rationalists may appeal to God as the criterion of truth. Our contem-
porary rationality is based on intellectual proofs and reasoning that refer to experimentally established facts, and also 
on the construction of our concepts and ideas, which are interpreted as representations. 
6  In German: “Der Gegenstand ist’ bedeutet…das der Gegenstand anzuerkennen ist, d.h. dass er mit Recht 
anerkannt werden kann”.
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EL 80). Therefore, the truth is the correct affirmation of an object in the appropriate rela-
tion to it. We can say that human philosophical and true scientific ideas and concepts do 
not fall from heaven, but they are discovered or constructed (if we are representatives 
of constructivism) by a human reason in the appropriate mode of relation with objects. 
2. Twardowski as a Methodological Follower of Brentano
Lviv and Vienna were connected philosophically by Twardowski. At the University of Lviv, 
which was provincial (once again, philosophically) at that time, Twardowski organized 
the Lviv Philosophical School (later, after the World War II, this school was renamed the 
“Lviv-Warsaw School”). In this article we consider only the similarities between Brentano 
and his pupil Twardowski.
The well-known scholar Betty who studies Brentano’s influence upon Twardowski 
mentioned: “…realism, respect for a broadly construed Aristotelian metaphysics and a pref-
erence for scientifically oriented philosophy (clear, precise, rationalistic, anti-speculative 
in its method) over German idealism” are the common general traits which Brentano and 
Twardowski shared (Betti 2017: 306). Those traits were also common for “the spirit of 
the epoch”; this spirit was anti-Kantian and anti-idealistic. 
Twardowski brought Brentano’s ideas on the scientific style of doing philosophy, the 
common method for investigations in philosophy and natural sciences, the primordial role 
of psychology in the constitution of philosophy and natural sciences (the psychological 
analysis – introspection – of mental states that appear when we conduct some philosophi-
cal investigations or investigations of nature). 
In 1895, Twardowski arrived in Lviv from Vienna. The young, twenty-nine-year-old 
professor, a student of Brentano, immediately took up the organization of scientific and 
pedagogical activities.
Twardowski set himself the task of bringing the ideas of his teacher and supervisor 
to Lviv and to create the milieu for the new philosophy: “I felt it was my call to bring 
closer to my compatriots the way of doing philosophy that Franz Brentano had taught 
me, especially to introduce the spirit and method of that philosophy to the students” 
(Twardowski 1992: 29). 
Cavallin, the Swedish scholar who investigates Eastern-European philosophy, es-
pecially the Lviv-Warsaw School, suggested: “The most interesting of the texts kept in 
Lviv seems to be the installation lecture of Twardowski…” (Cavallin 1997: 33). The fact 
that Twardowski was a Brentanist in the field of methodology is striking in his inaugural 
lecture on November 15 1895, in which he refutes the distinction between the natural 
and philosophical branches of knowledge. He criticizes the positivists who claim that 
metaphysics is unnecessary. Metaphysics as well as philosophical and natural sciences 
deals not only with the sphere of the sensory world (phenomena and objects) but also 
with the non-sensual. For instance, metaphysics and natural sciences have in common 
the study of the relationship between objects, the research of causes and consequences, 
as well as the issue of the relationship between the speculative and sensual worlds, and 
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of how the concept of natural sciences relates to the phenomena of nature and so on. 
Therefore, according to Twardowski, it is impossible to oppose metaphysics to natural 
sciences because they have a common area of research (moreover, there is an interesting 
question about how the development of natural sciences influenced philosophy and vice 
versa, how philosophy influenced natural sciences). 
In the second part of the lecture, Twardowski deals with the method of philosophy 
and the natural sciences. It is believed that the method of the natural sciences is an induc-
tion, but that is not true. Take the example of mechanics. Twardowski claims: “At first 
mechanics was also inductive, but later it could reach, with the help of generalizations, 
the formulations of several laws from which it derives purely deductively the laws of 
individual phenomena of motion ... There are other natural sciences as well that use de-
ductive method, namely zoology...” (Twardowski 1994: 231).
Although Twardowski does not deny the importance of metaphysics, he believes that 
metaphysicians should abandon the construction of all-embracing metaphysical systems. 
Metaphysics is only a partial synthesis, not a complete one. 
Thus, the main idea of Twardowski’s inaugural lecture – that there is no striking 
difference between sciences and humanities, and the methods used by philosophy and 
metaphysics do not differ from those used for the study of nature. This is very Brentanian 
position. Therefore, it is not surprising that Twardowski advocated the creation of scien-
tific philosophy based on the validity of judgements, non-speculative, logical-linguistic 
analysis of concepts, scrupulous research of narrow philosophical problems, and the 
refusal to build universal philosophical (metaphysical) systems. 
3. The Traces of Reception of Brentano's Theory of Judgement by  
Contemporary Ukrainian Researches and the Problem of Psychologism 
Borys Dombrowskiy (1948-2016), who, unfortunately, has passed away recently, inves-
tigated the heritage of Twardowski, due to this his scientific interests also included the 
views of Brentano. 
For him, Brentano was the forerunner of analytic philosophy. In the center of his in-
vestigation, Dombrowskiy puts Brentano’s theory of judgement because, as he mentioned, 
“analytic philosophy is the analysis with the help of the linguistic tools of expression, 
even without questioning “analysis of what?”, the focus will be on Brentano’s theory of 
judgement, without the analysis of which it is impossible to understand neither the role 
of the tradition of Brentanism in analytical philosophy, nor the works of the Austrian 
philosopher” (Dombrowskiy 2011: 84).
Dombrowskiy is interested in existential judgements of the “S is P” type, which 
Brentano reduced to the form “that is P”, or more precisely, “that S, which is P”. In such 
a reduced existential judgement, the existence of a single object is confirmed on the basis 
of its clear and obvious inner perception (the subjectless judgement about the existence 
of a single thing). Dombrowskiy concludes that Brentano moves from the existence of 
things to their essence. This is his reism – there are things that can be given clearly and 
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accurately in our inner perception. This Dombrowskiy’s conclusion about Brentano’s reism 
does coincide with Woleński’s suggestions on Brentano’s specific reism which consist of 
interpretation of Aristotelian understanding of being as concrete things and Albertazzi’s 
definition of Brentano’s doctrine as “immanent realism” (Woleński 1996: 357; Albertazzi 
2006: 128). The object/thing that we perceive is presented by our consciousness. Our 
presentation of the object/thing is objective and reflects object/thing that exists. We can 
present only the object/thing that does exist7.
But Dombrowskiy does not agree with Brentano that the subject (individual) can make 
such true judgements about the existence of a separate thing. This means that perceptions 
are subjective, depending on the peculiarities of perception of a person, which contains not 
only rational-logical components but also emotional-evaluative ones. For Dombrowskiy, 
Brentano appears as a sophist, who relativizes existence and truth. Whatever Brentano 
says about the ability to clearly and accurately perceive a single thing and, based on this 
inner perception, to make judgements about the existence of this thing, he nevertheless 
continues the line of Sophists who are known to have argued that man is the measure of all 
things. Man cannot go beyond the limits of his own, subjective, perception of things that 
are not direct but are mediated by images, ideas, and concepts. We should not speak about 
the direct accurate and clear perception of things but rather about the fact that things are 
perceived by us through mental activity, as a result of which images, ideas, and concepts 
about things are created that are not the things themselves, but things for us. There is no 
identity between the philosopher and the things which he speaks up about.
Thus, Dombrowskiy addresses the problem of creativity in the broad sense of the 
word: from certain created physical objects of culture (artefacts) to mental creativity, 
which includes the creation of images, signs, symbols, and concepts. His understanding 
of creative activity arises from his critical considerations of Twardowski’s views on the 
human acts and their consequences; this is to say, products, not only as physical artefacts 
but also mental products, i.e. symbols as concepts (Dombrowskiy 2004; Dombrowskiy 
2008a; Dombrowskiy 2008b). For Dombrowskiy, creativity has a negative meaning 
and it is a distortion of reality. This conclusion follows from the fact that creativity was 
a violation of the law as “the symbol of prohibition”, given by the Creator, and a man 
wants to be God (Dombrowskiy 2006: 44). There were only symbols before concepts. 
Dombrowskiy considers concepts as the products of creative mental activity in order to 
fix the existence of things, not essences (the being of things). 
Another Ukrainian researcher of Brentano’s legacy is Yanosh Sanotskiy, the chief of 
the Department of Neurology at Lviv Regional Clinical Hospital. He is interested in Bren-
tano’s reformation of logic and ontology. Sanotskiy was the first Ukrainian scholar who 
defended the PhD thesis under the title “Logic and Ontology in the Philosophy of Franz 
7  Let me consider the case of an unreal object, such as the Pegasus or Unicorn. It doesn’t exist; therefore, it is 
non-being that means non-object or non-thing. But we can present it in our consciousness. In this sentence lies the 
mistake. We can only present those objects that exist: if an object doesn’t exist, then we can only imagine it. So, a 
Pegasus or Unicorn is the imaginable object that exists only in our consciousness. Presentation and the image are the 
products of the two different capacities of our psychic life: to present and to imagine. 
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Brentano” in 1999 (Moscow, Russia). There are no other significant works of Sanotskiy; 
his publishing activity is low nowadays. Obviously, it is because Sanotskiy is quite busy 
in the medical profession. However, he has published recently an abstract under the title 
“Brentano on Ambiguity of the Notion of Psychologism” (Sanotskiy 2016). 
Sanotskiy sees the relevance of appealing to the philosophy of Brentano in the non-
standard approach of the Austrian philosopher to logic. For Brentano, logic is the bridge 
between psychology and ontology. Logic examines the real structures of the world of 
things, and the mental processes (thinking) determine its laws. Introducing the concept 
of intentionality, Brentano “strongly” unites thinking (consciousness) with the existence 
of things in the outside world. The theory of objects (ontology) was developed, which 
corresponds to the mental processes that acquire knowledge of the objects. Thus, scientific 
philosophy, whose methodology does not differ from the methodology of the natural sci-
ences, was initiated. (This method is based on introspection, through which the common 
field of things is singled out, both for the natural and for the philosophical sciences). For 
Brentano, it is not the borrowing of the methodology from the natural sciences that mat-
tered but the creation of a common methodology for philosophy and natural sciences (and 
here the empirical experience is in common, as a combination of external perception and 
inner perception, which we have already mentioned).
Unlike Dombrowskiy, Sanotskiy does not believe that Brentano’s psychologism leads to 
the subjectivity of experience. Sanotskiy writes about this in his abstract mentioned above. 
Sanotskiy argues that “psychology as naturalism cannot be applied to the evaluation 
of Brentanian understanding of the relationship between logic and psychology, since 
descriptive psychology is not identical to the natural-scientific, or, due to Brentano’s 
terminology, genetic philosophy” (ibid., 203). Therefore, Brentano cannot be considered 
a psychologist in the traditional sense of the word.
The second meaning of psychology, according to Sanotskiy, Brentano defines as “at the 
intersection of ontology and epistemology” (ibid., 203). The logic that provides the right 
judgement is a part of epistemology. Therefore, ontological issues are solved by logic. 
Brentano rejects the ideality of objects – their truth as well as their transcendence (Kant’s 
“things-in-themselves”); neither thing is learned a priori. Again, “only the data of internal 
experience are for him [Brentano – I.K.] the last reason for solving not only ontological 
but also all philosophical issues, including ethical and aesthetic ones” (ibid., 204). A person 
can achieve such beliefs that do not need proof. Such beliefs are direct cognition, on the 
basis of which direct judgements are formed. And, as Sanotskiy notes, “they are, in fact, the 
foundation on which philosophy and science are built, and they are the criterion of whether 
all other judgements have any value for us, that is, whether they are true” (ibid., 204). 
Conclusions
In this article, the source of analytic philosophy was discussed. This source we can trace 
to Brentano and from him to Twardowski, the founder of the Lviv Philosophical School. 
Also, it is very important to trace the notion of analysis and give emphasis on the study of 
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a priori reasoning about basic or analytic truths in Brentano’s and Twardowski’s thought 
to Descartes and Leibniz. These thinkers, as well as Hume, are the historical figures to 
which analytic philosophers look for their tradition. 
The emergence of analytic or scientific philosophy is based on psychology, which 
Brentano called psychognosy or “pure psychology”. The very beginning of analytic phi-
losophy is the analysis of our cognitive experience which produces notions and judgements. 
Brentano’s investigations of the psychic life remind us that the analytic philosopher must 
be attentive to his/her own intellectual states and actions, the formation of judgements and 
their structure; he/she must understand how perceptions have created the images which 
underlie the basis of concepts. Attentiveness leads to clarity and exactness in the thinking. 
Twardowski also claimed that philosophers must think clearly and that there aren’t any 
philosophical problems which cannot be expressed or presented clearly (Twardowski 1979: 
1). Analytic philosophers must again pay attention to psychology, linguistic analysis of 
the philosophical/logical judgements, and don’t be afraid of the so-called psychologism. 
Brentano’s psychognosy is very important today because we are living in the time of 
“the flow of consciousness” when we have two kinds of disorder of psychic life: 1) the 
disorder of senses and its consequence; 2) the disorder of impressions. This means the lack 
of “transcendental synthesis of apperception” (Kant), which provides the unity of different 
elements of inner psychic life and forms coherent experience. The disorder of senses causes 
fragmented impressions and aggressive sensualism – because of the lack of analysis of the 
basis of mental life. Brentano’s psychognosy describes the elements of our mind, which 
helps to accept the objects realistically on the base of the inner certitude; such elements of 
mind can organize sensuous impressions in the proper way and provide adequate pictures 
of objects and the overcoming of the “disorder of senses and impressions”. 
We concentrated on Dombrowskiy’s and Sanotskiy’s researches in order to show 
some attempts to study Brentano’s and Twardowski’s thoughts in the sphere of logic and 
ontology. We can conclude that, in Ukraine, the reception of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s 
philosophy is fragmented and sporadic. There is a lack of systematic studying of their 
philosophy. Under systematic studying of Brentano’s and Twardowski’s philosophy, I 
mean: a) translating into Ukrainian all important works of Brentano and Twardowski8; 
b) the communication with well-known European scholars who investigate Brentano’s 
and Twardowski’s philosophy; c) participation in the events (conferences, round tables, 
symposiums etc.) dedicated to Brentano’s and Twardowski’s philosophy. 
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